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What's real for law? byJosephVining 
T11t Joll011111g t'''"l "1ulu111t•d /rum u pa1>er the 1mtl1or 1Jrese111ed tlus \/arcl1 nt t1 111/) Fuw11lt1t1011 
co11ferenct• at \O/n' Dnme I 1111 ')c/wol, 1mcl u lecture g1re11 /mt Octol1er, 111 u 5) 111pow1111 111 tlic 
Center for Lrn P/11/o,u11h). mu/ C11lt11re, Catho/1c U1m'en>H) Law School T11e October nmpo~mm 
mul ,\/urcli co11fc11.mee e\plorec/ 1,111e1 mu/ q11est10m mr-.ed 17) Umversrl} of Sun Diego Lm11 Profe~1or 
Sre1•e11 /) S111rt/1 '.1 Lnw\ Q11m1tlm1 llamml U111vemlJ Press. 200-1 J T11e co11171lete lecture, togetl1er 
mtli lect11re1 re11w11d111~ ro tlw lmuk gh1e11 q' Professor Patnck McK111leJ• Bre111u111, Jmt1ce Auto11111 
)c11/111, 111111 Profe\1or Ua;d H'<:111rei1, and a f11rtl1er prei.entatiou b)· Professor '>mith, rs be111g 1mb-
/1shetl 111 55 Cct1hul1c U111v1m1ty L11w Hev1ew No. 3, 671-685 (Spr111g 2006) 
L aw is nol academic. The unherSll) is not its home. Law is in 
the\\ 1der ''orld and 1~ pervasive there, m language, thought, 
and action. Ever) One 1s imbued "1th it. I ''ant to raise here the 
question '' hether la" might ha'e an ontolog) of its own. In 
!Us elegant and accessible nc11 book, Law's Qyandary (Han ard 
Unhersit) Press, 200~). te,cn m1th groups our \anous 
senses of" hat 1s real for us into three "ontological families," 
the "mundane," the ''.,cicntific" mcludmg mathematics, and 
the "religious." La" toda) operates in an "ontological gap," he 
suggests, unless its practiuoncrs are m fact drawing upon the 
resources of the third of these famil1c , the rellgious, in under-
standing and explammg "hat the) do and their authority for 
what they say. 
There ma) be an additional and fourth such "ontological 
family," law's own. 
When we turn to contemporary scientific and mathematical 
description and discussion we see how overt the ontological 
is all arow1cl us. Ontological claims are signaled generally by 
the verbs "b" and "exists" and of course by the adverb "really." 
They may be negauvc or posit!\ c. For instance, a prominent 
physicist, pleading rcccnll) to the general re;ider for greater 
understanding and acceptance of "indirect scientific evidence," 
presents "field thcor)" as "the theor) I use that ... describes 
objects exbtmg throughout space that create and destroy 
particles." he :.peaks of"ob,cn mg" as "mvol"ing a train of 
theoretical logic b, "h1ch "c can interpret what is' een m and, 
with regard to ~pace and the dimensions of space, "establish the 
existence of extra d11nens1ons." In the end she turns to a form of 
majorit) rule, "the bulk of the scientific community" deter-
mining the "true story," but that her own claims are "ontolog-
1cal" m character ts e' 1dent. "Do I believe in extra dimensions?" 
she "rites el e" here "I confess I do. . . . ometimes ... an 
idea seems like ll must contain a germ of truth .... I suddenly 
realized that I reall} belie' ed that some form of extra dimen-
sion:. must exist" (L1 a Randall, "Dangling Particles," \ 'en York 
Times, cptcmber 18, 2005; ll'<irped Passa9es (2005], 3). 
Agamst this background of 01·ert ontology let me slip mto 
law's ",th an example that cuts across the scientific, the legal, 
and the religious. A \en )ork Times op-ed comment by Bernd 
Hemrich ("Tall to the Animals," August 26, 2005) on the 
popular 2005 documentary on the Antarctic penguin, March ef 
the Pen9ums, argued" ith appro,·al that we have become more 
comfortable calling "hat "c s-cc there "love." The comment was 
of the kind thal propo cs casing or eliminating the line between 
human beings and animals by pulling us across it toward them, 
rather than them across it toward us. 
"I '\'e long known the story of the Emperor penguins," the 
commentator says, "ha' mg cold it to generations of biology 
students as a textbook example of adaptation .... ln a broad 
physiological sense, "e arc practically identical not only ";th 
other mammals but also with birds ... except for differences in 
detail of parucular design specifications." 
Then comes the ontological statement of interest. 
"Functionall)." he sa)S, "I suspect Joie ban often temporar) 
chemical imbalance of the brain induced by senSOl") stimuli 
that causes us to maintain focus on 'omething that carries an 
adapm·c agenda ." The ontological claim is made b) the "is" in 
")o,e is .... " It is modified slightly b) bis term "functional I)," but 
the point of his commcntar) is to urge us, the "us'' that appears 
m his definition of lo1c, noc to be shy about using the word 
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"love" for what moves the penguin- what moves the penguin 
need be no different from wbat moves us, an often temporary 
chemical imbalance of the brain that is adaptive. 
Thi is a textbook example of ontology that wishes to be 
thought scientific, chosen for 'vicle publication. To reOect here 
for a moment on how law might approach Lhis statement and 
claim may bring out aspects of law's own ontology. 
'What would the legal mfad do with a statement like this, in 
thinking about coming to some conclusion about love? In law 
we are all witnesses, as we often arc also in personal life. vVhcn 
presented in law with this sentence about love, there would 
be interest in what this same individual said at home, what 
he meant when heard to sa) "! love you" to his wife or child, 
friend, or sister. Putting the two statements together, the one 
made at home and the one made professionally, as would be 
done in cross-examination on a witness stand, a lawyer or jury 
would conclude, I think, either that the word ''love" in the one 
tatement, made in class when teaching the penguin 's love as 
a textbook example of a system operating in an adaptive way, 
means something different from "love" in the other statement 
at home, or, if the two words are meant to convey the same, 
that he doesn't believe what he is saying in class. It would not 
affect thinking about love, in the latter case, any more than any 
witness's statement is taken seriouslv if shown on cross exami-
' nation to be one in which he does not believe. As for whether 
he might consistently concei,·e of love and himself in this way, a 
lawyer or jury would hear him speaking too in asking for trust 
and authority a~ a teacher, and in his gestures and in his self-
restraint toward those he says he loves. 
La" does not ha,·e a special sense of love, though if law did, 
it would be expressed in John Noonan's very heautiful response 
to Richard Posner's '' iew of moral and political theory. But law 
doe~ not stop with a scientific sense of love, if this teaching 
is in any way an example of it. Law could not stop with the 
scientific, not because law is intrinsically ordinary on the one 
hand or religious on the other, but because of la" 's own various 
underlying commitments that can be fairly called ontological: 
• Commitment to the presence of persom whose statements 
and actions may be spread over time both within and beyond an 
individual pan of life; 
• Commitment to the possibility of authenticity in those 
statements; 
• Commitment to the sense of language mi th exl"lo res in Laws 
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~andary, that linguistic meaning is thl' meaning of a person, 
always, whatever we pretend- is always metaphorical if you 
will; and, finally, 
• Commitment to a first fact, basic, on \\ hich other conclusions 
are built, the fact we arc more than one, and, when one of us 
speaks. about anything, he or she is only one. 
It is true that many call "lo\(~., the something more m the 
very structure of the unh erse than form (that merely is). I have 
mentioned John oonan in law. This something more call it 
love- make possible a human mind that cares. It is necessary 
to human authority and authenticity toward which lawyers 
work, as necessary to lawyers' work as oxygen. ince it has no 
place in the ontological family of science and mathematic) (as 
oxygen has), its reality for law, lawyers, and legal thought may 
be drawn from the "resources" of the other ontological fami ly 
that is not mundane, linking law directly in the mosc basic way 
to what is beyond both law and science. But all Lhat is necessary 
to law is not in law's own ontology. All that is necessary to 
science is not in science's own. What is perhaps most necessary 
to scientific work, individual freedom, even creativity and trust, 
would be hard to find "existing" there. Science remains distinct, 
as can law. The hwnan indjvidual remains distinct, one's reaJiry 
one's own, even though one's own resources of mind and spirit 
are manifestly inadequate. 
Pulling ontological claims generally into the open, as mith 
does in his book, will I think bring what is real for law into 
the open over time, it "ontological inventory," in Smith's 
nice phrase. Authority is there, as a reality. Purpose is there, 
and inquiry into purpose, significant against the background 
of current pre~entations of' scientific method in ontological 
terms - Jacques Monod'~ is the classic statement of this kind, 
that po:.tulatcs of purpose anywhere in nature, which would 
include us, "exist at odds with objective knowledge, face away 
from truth, and are strangers and fundamentally hostile to 
science." 
The legal mind has its own sense of time, very much 
associated with supra-individual persons in Law, and with the 
connection of any conclusion in law to action, which fo llows 
acknowledgement of authority. Time is tbe realest thing in 
the world, we may be inclined to think and continue to think 
despite hearing some in physics happily making the ontological 
statement that it can be shown to be only an illusion. But the 
clefinicion or sense of this "it" in one context-ordinary indi -
v1dual lifl' or the· astronomical or the religious or the musical 
may not sene at all well m .mother, even through carried from 
context 10 contc\.l is the experience of reaclung to express the 
'amc thmg, "time" La"' 1s one of the-.e contexts in and of itself. 
Perhap~ most 1rreplaccably, the individual lives in law's onto-
logical inventory, the human individual and, Lo an increasing 
degree, the indfr1dual animal. Law'~ commitment to the fact we 
are more than one is fundamental, not co be shut out of thought 
methoclolog1call) or ontologically. This can be said noting, all 
the while, that violent 1mpos1tion of pure\\ ill occurs through 
legal proce~ses, and that power 1s exercised in the name of the 
la" b) those "ho can secure lor the moment some extension of 
their mdl\ 1dual ~trength But this is what "the law," ontolog1caUy 
peaking, seb its fan• against. o often this is just what legal 
argument 1s about La" contaim the terms of i~ own po\\erfuJ 
and efTcctJ'e cntKl\m, "l11ch look to and maintain the indi-
v1dual m the world, along with the person, purpose, and lhing 
value. The ~trength of thl· mdi' 1dual in legal thought is not 
unlike the strength of natural selection in biological thought, or 
of force in php1cs. 
We can go so far a~ "rea,,on" itself, on which mith has 
written eloquently hl·rc and else" here. Reasoning or the 
rauonal has for most an ontological aspect. Its presence is often 
thought to diffem1tiatc the human from the animal. Rationality 
might be viewed as everywhere and essentially just consciou,,ly 
staying open to the evidence and fitting means to ends. But 
it is split into kinds reasoning "scientific" or "logical" often 
in"olvcs capturing a perception or phenomenon, "time" for 
instance, or "lo' c ,"or "lifl'," so that 1t can be boxed and marupu-
latecl, and then lllltllzing 1t o that it can be put "ith other ''like" 
phenomena in a clas~ or group that can al~o be manipulated. 
Any kind of probab1ht) or 'tatisucs involve both the ·e, capture 
and unit111ng. The) seem to be ncce sar) "hcneYer seeing 
\Omethmg as a '''tern or pan ol a ')Stem, which may in turn be 
nec:essar) for manipulation. 
Legal thought e'entuall) depart:. from this. Capturing elimi-
nates the contmuou~ unfoldingncss of dungs and the realil:) 
of the nece,sity of assent to characterizations of perception, 
unitizing eliminates the reality of mdh idualit;·-both realities, 
again, being part of the "ontological inventory" of law. The signal 
of a move from the rational and reasoning in la'" ro the rational 
and reasoning a~ it proceeds in other fields often is substitution 
of an abstract symhol for a word, phrase, or sentence of human 
language. Thjs is not to .say th.n capturing and unitizing arc not 
useful m human affairs. But 1t may be to say that the usefulne,,s 
m human affairs of such reasoning extends only to the point 
''here the force of law, that proceeds from human imagination 
and creativity, b brought to bear on a situation and the future 
emerg ing from it. 
Large words these, creativity, time, person, reason, indi-
vidual, purpose, value, authority. But they are no larger than 
dimension, universe, reason, lime, or force in scientific and 
mathematical discussion . Can these be realities as well as words 
for law, without making a commionent to law into a religious 
commitment? l 011 'r CJ!iando9 more than suggests there is an 
implicit commttment to the "cx1.stence" or "reality" of these 
thmgs that are not JUSt thmgs when one acts and takes responsi-
b1ltt) m the name of the la\\ . It is commjtrnent in the absence of 
which one could often not brmg oneself co do what one does, 
I tlunk, or be able to do 1t needing the help or forbearance of 
other~ "ho arc also implicitly ~o commttted and who judge the 
authentlCJC) of one's own. Can the affinities between the world 
of la" and the world of religious commitment be as close as 
they are so close that lawyers may be said to work at the ,•ery 
least in an anteroom to the home of religious commionent-
w1thout leadmg one empirically or introspectively to conclude 
they arc m fact the same? 
Lau c<mlt11111., the ler111s of its ow11 
pou e1fzt I a 11d e..f]t!cl it ·e critic is Ill, 
ll l11ch /ooh to lllul 111ui11t{li11 
1l1e 11ulil'icl11al i11 1/1e 1mrld. 
a/rm~ ll it/1 the pcrsu11, p11rpo~e. 
c11ul / n 111~ 1·cd11e. 
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